| Brian Holmes via nettime-l on Wed, 18 Nov 2026 16:03:02 +0100 (CET) |
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| Re: <nettime> Falling into the Breach |
Folks, I totally agree that the infrastructure in the US is old and the administration is vastly incompetent, making even very important systems like air traffic control uniquely vulnerable. But the observation misses two key things about the present situation. The first is that there is very likely a reason for the current confusion: it's because US officials and their private contractors are legally barred from speaking about cybersecurity events, due to legal frameworks like these: -- CIRCIA (Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical Infrastructure Act): Implemented by CISA, CIRCIA requires critical infrastructure operators (aviation, energy, banking, telecom) to report major cyber incidents within 72 hours. Crucially, the statute classifies these reports as strictly confidential, exempts them from Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests, and prohibits agencies from sharing them publicly in any way that identifies the victim without consent. -- Defense Industrial Base Rules (DFARS): Contractors like L3Harris or major aerospace firms are bound by Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement clauses requiring rapid incident reporting to the Pentagon while strictly prohibiting public disclosure of unclassified controlled technical information (CTI) without DoD clearance. The second point is that the use of AI to bring down those old, vulnerable systems has reached a crisis level, as you can see by this FBI cybersecurity flash that was released on Nov 13: Threat Overview of ARTEX Autonomous Penetration Testing Framework https://www.ic3.gov/CSA/2026/261113.pdf Summary The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is releasing this FLASH to highlight the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the ARTEX autonomous penetration testing framework. ARTEX is an open-source, large language model (LLM)-driven agentic platform that threat actors have weaponized to automate multiple phases of cyber intrusions at machine speed, from reconnaissance through data exfiltration. Since at least August 2026, a variety of malicious cyber actors have used ARTEX to conduct campaigns targeting organizations globally across multiple sectors, including financial services, government, technology, defense, semiconductor, energy, healthcare, manufacturing, telecommunications, and legal industries.1,2,3,4,5 ARTEX significantly reduces the time required to chain attack techniques, with some intrusions progressing from initial targeting to privileged access in under three hours.² The framework enables threat actors with minimal technical expertise to conduct complex, multi-target operations simultaneously, fundamentally accelerating attack velocity and expanding operational scale. Notable campaigns include financially motivated attacks against South Korean financial institutions resulting in exfiltration of personal information from approximately 67,000 individuals,6,7,8 and a supply chain compromise affecting ConnectWise Cloud Backup customers that resulted in attempted sign-ins to more than 2,250 downstream tenants.2 Following public disclosure of malicious usage, the original ARTEX developer removed the GitHub repository in October 2026.3 However, the framework continues to proliferate through community forks, localized variations, archived copies, and a commercial version (ARTEX PRO), ensuring continued availability to threat actors.3,10 As of early November 2026, researchers identified over 1,600 publicly exposed ARTEX console instances, with total deployments likely significantly higher when including systems behind firewalls or in private networks.9 The FBI encourages organizations—particularly those operating internet-exposed applications, self- service portals, cloud infrastructure, and partner/supplier systems—to implement the recommendations in the Mitigations section to reduce the likelihood and impact of ARTEX-enabled intrusions. Threat ARTEX is an autonomous, multi-agent penetration testing platform written in Go.3,4 The framework translates high-level tactical goals described in natural language into actionable machine commands executed by specialized super intelligence (SI) agents, requiring minimal human interaction beyond initial objective setting.2,3 ARTEX does not include its own SI model but integrates with external LLM providers, including frontier models (Anthropic Claude, OpenAI GPT) and open-source or Chinese-origin models (DeepSeek, GLM, Grok, Kimi).3,6,7,9 Analysis of attacker-controlled ARTEX instances shows Chinese models are most prevalent, with DeepSeek Flash family models dominating usage due to their balance of capabilities, relatively low cost, and lack of observable guardrails when framed for penetration testing.7,9 Originally released on GitHub by developer “Autumn-27” in July 2026, ARTEX gained rapid adoption, reaching an estimated 1,500–2,000 GitHub stars within 10 weeks.4 The developer stated the tool was intended for authorized security testing within defined scopes and made the repository unavailable on October 8, 2026, following reports of threat actor abuse.3,6 Despite this action, ARTEX remains widely accessible through independent routes and mirrors on code-sharing platforms.3,4,9 Observed Capabilities and Potential Uses Based on observed capabilities and ongoing threat actor adoption, ARTEX presents the following risks: • Accelerated Multi-Target Operations: SI agents provide automation for the time-consuming phases of enumeration and exploitation; small threat groups can run concurrent intrusion campaigns at a scale previously unavailable to them. • Exploitation of Overlooked Attack Surfaces: ARTEX excels at identifying and exploiting peripheral systems receiving less security attention than flagship applications, including partner and supplier portals, mobile backends, employee applications, sales-support systems, legacy services, third- party integrations, and applications created across different business units.1 • Supply Chain Compromise: Agents have demonstrated capability to identify and exploit supply chain attack vectors, including modifying iOS application distribution infrastructure via exposed cloud credentials.9 Autonomous agents can systematically map trust relationships between organizations. By identifying and compromising weaker third-party vendors, CI/CD pipelines, or integrated software providers, attackers can leverage ARTEX to pivot from a peripheral supplier directly into high-value upstream enterprise networks. • Reduced Barrier to Entry: ARTEX lowers technical barriers for conducting complex intrusions, enabling threat actors with minimal expertise to execute sophisticated campaigns.3,9 [snip] For a broader look at the landscape of automated agentic intrusion, including other frameworks beyond ARTEX, see this Google threat intelligence brief from Nov 16: https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/agentic-threat-activity-crosses-a-significant-threshold So, it's interesting to see in some detail how both state and corporate actors respond to an emergency that the public isn't even allowed to know about.... The details are out there, but you have to drill down a little. I would be curious to hear more about all this. On Wed, Nov 18, 2026 at 6:10 AM Felix Stalder via nettime-l < nettime-l@lists.nettime.org> wrote: > > As far as I can see, there is an incredible potent mix creating the > current vulnerabilities of infrastructures: > > - neglected infrastructures after a decades of neo-liberal hostility > towards "unproductive" maintenance and general hatred of public > investment, with Dodge and all the chainsaw guys being the meme- > contingent of this (apparently, the router that caused the breakdown of > the US flight control system should have been replaced in 2005). > > - centralization of IT infrastructure in near monopolies that makes what > might have been routine interruptions global affairs. > > - geopolitical will to escalate of infrastructure attacks (such as the, > apparently, Iranian attacks on freezer systems in Europe and the US, > again on systems that were officially decommissioned a long time ago, > hence unmaintained by the vendor (and, I assume, unmaintainable by the > users, should they have wanted to, due to copyright restrictions)). > > - and, AI, which is both offering new capabilities but also allows > everyone to make all kinds of effectively unverifiable claims regarding > those capacities and possible strategies. > > At least for the latter, AI seems to increase the speed at which a > vulnerability can be exploited (think of the recent PHP issues), I > haven't seen too much evidence about it finding really new ones (rather > than detecting known ones that have not been fixed in a particular system). > > That seems to be the main point of this excellent video that examined in > detail the supposedly massive Linux kernel vulnerabilities found by AI, > posted not too long ago here. > > On 22/10/2026 01:29, Louis Rawlins via nettime-l wrote: > > > Today, I spent some time reading through dialogues on the Project VRM > > mailing list with Doc Searles. Somebody there shared this: > > > > Greg Kroah-Hartman / Kernel Recipes 2026 - Security in the LLM age > https:// > > www.youtube.com/watch?v=NnV_cWeoo5Q > > > All of this is only to reiterate Ted's point. The layers of complexity > and nontransparency are so thick that infrastructure breakdowns become > essentially unknowable to most of the people and institutions that > depend on them. > > > all the best. Felix > > > > On 18/11/2026 05:42, Ted Byfield via nettime-l wrote: > > > The people I know who reliably know about these things know nothing. > > We saw the same thing with the wholesale destruction and abandonment > > of US military bases across the Mideast — something seemingly > > impossible to keep secret, and yet still very little is known about > > it. In that case one of the US government’s levers is its power over > > satellite imagery companies; I think similar mechanisms are probably > > at play in these network failures. And then there’s the strange case > > of a US submarine that recently “grounded” and, soon after, its > > command staff was fired — Congress should have been notified of both, > > but is only finding out now: > > > > https://counter.ink/blg/new/2026-11-14-uss-south-dakota-mystery > > > > I think we’re beginning to see just how many ways Trump & Co have > > utterly broken the US: the ongoing corruption from the top, the > > rampant abuses of the oligarchy, the post-DOGE skeleton-crew logic, > > the pervasive fear among those who remain, the dissolution of channels > > between federal agencies, the ubiquitous fear and suspicion within the > > Pentagon, the absolute lack of trust among US allies, the witches’ brew > > of destructive incentives reshaping how business deals with the > government, > > the abject failure of congressional oversight, the complete mistrust > > across the entire field of law from to to bottom, the complete > > destruction of meaningful bipartisan cooperation in Congress, the > > preoccupation of the incoming Dem majority with leadership fight > > dynamics, the collapse of cooperation between federal and state > > governments, the pathetic subservience of the media, and just generally > > the impossibility of reaching the one and only consensus we need at > > this point — that the people and party in power are a stunningly > > impossible combination of imbecilic, incompetent, delusional, > > dishonest, and incredibly destructive. Everyone worth their salt > > knows that the US is teetering on the edges of a dozen abysses at > > once and is terrified that if it falls into one we’ll all fall into > > all. > > > > And I didn’t even mention AI. > > -- > | |||||||||||||||| http://felix.openflows.com | > | |||||||||| https://tldr.nettime.org/@festal | > | for secure communication, please use signal | > > -- > # distributed via <nettime>: no commercial use without permission > # <nettime> is a moderated mailing list for net criticism, > # collaborative text filtering and cultural politics of the nets > # more info: https://www.nettime.org > # contact: nettime-l-owner@lists.nettime.org > -- # distributed via <nettime>: no commercial use without permission # <nettime> is a moderated mailing list for net criticism, # collaborative text filtering and cultural politics of the nets # more info: https://www.nettime.org # contact: nettime-l-owner@lists.nettime.org