| Brian Holmes via nettime-l on Wed, 18 Nov 2026 19:35:47 +0100 (CET) |
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| Re: <nettime> Falling into the Breach |
Ted wrote: "Institutionalist analyses read well because they can seem on their face so concrete and specific. But in this one I’m definitely taking the culturalist view. It doesn’t negate the things you’ve mentioned (and legal frameworks are definitely institutionalist in nature), it just situates them more meaningfully in something like a Geertzian thick description." I am definitely in favor of the thick description. I am currently reading about the concept of pre-compliance (aka anticipatory obedience) which is used to analyze the combined phenomena of information control in the press and direct repression by civil society actors (museum boards, university officials, Silicon Valley firms etc). Pre-compliance has a long history, stretching back through 9/11 to the Cold War. So yeah, no objection at all, we're just onto different aspects. Probably I am more ignorant than many of you as to the geeky stuff. But since we have before our eyes what looks like a big pre-compliance event in the press, I am fascinated by what is not being talked about: the technical details of AI-enabled hacking, plus the more familiar structure of arms-length support by states for those kinds of cyber-attacks. Interestingly the NY Times has only one mention of ARTEX (a month ago), and they seem to have said nothing about the Optimizely intrusion, another major hack that took place the day before yesterday. While the state fails and the media obfuscates, the situation grows more extreme. The development of AI has created an emergency situation: not rogue agents but super-empowered human actors. The Trump administration is choking off news about it and the media are complying with state control. Maybe they're afraid of popular panic? On the ground and even in the air, we are all sitting ducks for whatever may happen. curiously, Brian On Wed, Nov 18, 2026 at 10:20 AM GM - tedbyfield <tedbyfield@gmail.com> wrote: > I’m not sure how you could read my litany of breakdowns and could go on to > say so affirmatively that it misses a few key things, but you do you. The > legal frameworks you mention are important, sure, but to say they’re key > suggests that the rule of of law prevails — but *the defining feature* of > Trump 2 is that the rule of law does *not* apply. Innocent parties are > harassed with lawfare, guilty parties are rewarded and honored, existing > laws are ignored, and imaginary laws are imposed ruthlessly — all according > to a ‘logic’ so wildly erratic that to call it hormonal would be too > generous. If a company actively violated one of the legal frameworks you > mention but did so in ways that actively supported the whims of Trump & Co, > the biggest risk they’d run by far would be the inviolable principle that > everything Trump touched dies sooner or later. So, sure, those laws are a > factor in companies’ decision to remain silent, but they won’t be the first > thing that comes to mind in the C-suite (or even the counsel’s office, I’d > wager). And I say that on the basis of decades of paying pretty close > attention to how various entities in digital security have navigated the > shifting boundaries of compliance, disclosure, etc. > > Also: the litany of breakdowns in my last mail left out a *huge* factor > in this context — the Trumpian attack on higher ed. The resulting pressure > in HE to keep your head down and your moiuth shut has become excruciating > across the board, but in sensitive areas — constitutional law, for example > — it doesn’t matter which way someone throws the dice, they *will* lose. > If they don’t run afoul of Trump & Co, they’ll get spanked by admins who > live in terror of the Eye of Sauron will fall on their institution, or > incur the mistrust of their colleagues and peers. > > Historically, compsec has relied *very* heavily on academic research for > a variety of reasons — clearly structured areas of expertise, an equitable > issue-driven approach, rigorous standards, noncommercial incentives, legal > protections related to educational contexts, and so on. That old-school (so > to speak) system — exemplified by orgs like CERT at CMU, Spafford’s COAST > at Purdue, UC Davis’s Computer Security Lab, etc — has been breaking down > for quite a while, but now it seems to be dead. In fields like this, HE > researchers were like honeybees who could cross boundaries of every kind, > building networks and encouraging productively open exchange, but now not. > > More generally, I’ve been noticing more and more that discussions like > this tend to break down on institutionalist vs culturalist lines. > Institutionalist analyses read well because they can seem on their face so > concrete and specific. But in this one I’m definitely taking the > culturalist view. It doesn’t negate the things you’ve mentioned (and legal > frameworks are definitely institutionalist in nature), it just situates > them more meaningfully in something like a Geertzian thick description. > > Ted > > On 18 Nov 2026, at 10:02, Brian Holmes via nettime-l wrote: > > Folks, I totally agree that the infrastructure in the US is old and the > administration is vastly incompetent, making even very important systems > like air traffic control uniquely vulnerable. But the observation misses > two key things about the present situation. > > The first is that there is very likely a reason for the current confusion: > it's because US officials and their private contractors are legally barred > from speaking about cybersecurity events, due to legal frameworks like > these: > > <. . .> > -- # distributed via <nettime>: no commercial use without permission # <nettime> is a moderated mailing list for net criticism, # collaborative text filtering and cultural politics of the nets # more info: https://www.nettime.org # contact: nettime-l-owner@lists.nettime.org